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Philosophy and Constitutional Theory: The Cautionary Tale of Jeremy Waldron and 
the Philosopher's Stone 
Kyle L Murray* 
 
1. Introduction 
What is, or ought to be, the relationship between moral philosophy and constitutional theory? 
If one is writing about the latter, how far does one need to consider the implications for one’s 
arguments of different possible underlying stances in the former? How far can constitutional 
and political theorists ignore core moral philosophy and meta-ethical debates? Can they afford 
to? If not, how deeply into the philosophy must one delve? This paper seeks to pose some 
answers to these far-reaching questions by considering in detail a particular case study: an 
author whose work is of the highest importance in constitutional theory but which, it will be 
argued, reveals the perils of an inadequate engagement with core philosophy.  
That author is Jeremy Waldron, famous for his 'persistent'1 - even 'fanatical'2 - opposition to 
strong rights-based judicial review of legislation.3 In setting out that case, he has carved out a 
position as one of the most influential figures in contemporary constitutionalist debate. As 
Goldsworthy notes '[w]hatever one's point of view', Waldron's scholarship on the authority of 
the elected legislature and the issues raised by 'subjecting their enactments to judicial review, 
is essential reading'.4 Fellow critics of the authority of the judicial branches on rights-issues 
'have found a powerful champion', while supporters 'have the unenviable task of responding to 
                                                          
*Teaching Fellow in Public Law and Human Rights, and PhD Candidate, Durham Law School, UK. Email: 
k.l.murray@durham.ac.uk I owe particular thanks to Gavin Phillipson for his generous feedback on earlier drafts 
of this paper, and his even more generous encouragement and support in developing the thoughts presented here. 
Thanks also to Robert Craig for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to the anonymous reviewer for their 
thorough and thought-provoking criticisms – the challenge of responding to which has no doubt improved what 
follows. Any errors and flaws one may find in my arguments, of course, remain entirely my own.  
1 A Kavanagh, “Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron” (2003) 22:5 Law and 
Philosophy 451 at 466. 
2 J Waldron, “Compared to What? Judicial Activism and New Zealand’s Parliament” (2005) NZLJ 441 
at 442. 
3 See, for example, J Waldron, “A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights” (1993) 13 OJLS 18; 
J Waldron, “Participation: The Right of Rights” (1998) 98 Proceedings of the Royal Aristotelian Society 
307; J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); J Waldron, The 
Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); J Waldron, “The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346. 
4 J Goldsworthy, “Legislation, Interpretation, and Judicial Review” (2001) 51:1 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 75 at 86. 
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his critique.'5 While Waldron's opposition to strong judicial review6 is of interest as a strong 
challenge to the constitutional status quo in those parts of the world – such as the US - where 
such practices are well-established, he has become a particularly important force in those parts 
where such systems are not currently in place, where calls for reform are particularly common 
(and perhaps more realistic).  
In the UK, for example, the legal-political constitutionalist debate is as strong as ever, as shown 
by ongoing arguments over aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, the balance it strikes 
between the courts and elected political institutions,7 and the seemingly never-ending "will 
they-won't they?" controversy over Conservative plans to replace it with a British Bill of 
Rights.8 A similar story can be told throughout the Commonwealth, where relatively recent 
constitutional reforms have also sparked extensive debate - between pro and anti-Charter 
camps in Canada, for example,9 and in particular the debate over whether the non-use of the 
section 33 "override powers" by the Federal Parliament shows the Canadian system to have 
                                                          
5 Ibid. For examples of the plethora of critical engagements with Waldron's work, see J Raz, 
“Disagreement in Politics” (1998) 43 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25; T Christiano, “Waldron 
on Law and Disagreement” (2000) 19:4 Law and Philosophy 513; D Estlund, “Waldron on Law and 
Disagreement” (2000) 99:1 Philosophical Studies 111; Kavanagh, supra note 1; D Enoch, “Taking 
Disagreement Seriously: On Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement” (2006) 39:3 Israel Law Review 
22; RH Fallon Jr, “The Core of an Uneasy Case For Judicial Review” (2008) 121:7 HLR 1693. 
6 That is, to a system allowing the judicial strike-down of primary legislation enacted by a representative 
legislature on the basis of it being deemed incompatible with an entrenched Constitution or Bill of 
Rights. In strong-form systems, the only recourse for elected representatives - and, indirectly, the people 
- involves a departure from the ordinary majoritarian process, through a constitutional amendment 
procedure. See further, M Tushnet, “Alternative Forms of Judicial Review” (2003) 101 Michigan Law 
Review 2781. 
7 See generally, A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); T Campbell, KD Ewing & A Tomkins, eds, The Legal Protection 
of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
8 Conservative plans to replace the HRA with a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities were set out 
in the run-up to the 2015 General Election (Conservative Party, 'Protecting Human Rights in the UK: 
The Conservatives' Proposals for Changing Human Rights Laws (October 2014) available: 
<https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20files/human_rights.pdf> accessed 25 
January 2018).  Despite the Conservatives gaining a majority in that election, we are yet to see these 
proposals taken up, and they are currently on hold in the midst of Brexit. On the Bill of Rights debate 
see M Amos, “Problems with the Human Rights Act 1998 and How to Remedy Them: Is a Bill of Rights 
the Answer?” (2009) 72:6 MLR 883; H Fenwick, “The Human Rights Act or a British Bill of Rights: 
creating a down-grading recalibration of rights against the counter-terror backdrop?” (2012) PL 468.  
9 See, for example, J Allan, “An Unashamed Majoritarian” (2004) 27 Dalhousie Law Journal 537; WJ 
Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). More generally, see  JL Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative 
Model?” (2006) 69:1 MLR 7.; S Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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"collapsed" into one of judicial supremacy over rights.10 Similarly the merits of Australia’s 
continued refusal to adopt any form of general protection for fundamental rights at the federal 
level continues to be debated,11 even as some individual Australian states adopt statutory 
protection - modelled on the UK’s Human Rights Act - through a non-entrenched piece of 
legislation in which judicial decisions are subject to reversal or avoidance through the ordinary 
lawmaking process.12 In addition, the New Zealand government has recently announced its 
intention to pursue an amendment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to formally 
include a mechanism for judicial declarations of inconsistency.13 The developments there, and 
particularly what form and wording they will take, will no doubt be watched with interest by 
those concerned with the balance between judicial and legislative power on rights issues. In 
these politically-charged contexts, the arguments in which Waldron has become a key figure 
'have taken on a particular urgency',14 making Waldron himself an unavoidable voice in 
contemporary constitutionalist and political debate throughout the Commonwealth, and 
beyond.  
All of this gives some support to the shortlisting of Waldron by sympathetic commentator 
James Allan as one of those rare academics who might actually succeed, against 'the 
overwhelming odds', in gaining possession of 'the philosopher's stone'.15 That is, 'legal 
academia's equivalent of immortality',16 and one may add, infinite fortune,17 putting him 
alongside the likes of Bentham, Hart, Fuller, and Dworkin, whose work seems likely to endure 
far beyond their lifetime.18 For Allan, it is Waldron's 'strong defence of the elected legislature 
against the pretensions and purported moral superiority of the unelected judiciary' alone that 
                                                          
10 For this concern, see M Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights and 
Democracy-Based Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813. Section 33(1) of the Canadian 
Charter provides that 'Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15'.  
11 See, for example, the special edition of Queensland LR (2018) 35:2 edited by Gee and Ekins, 
dedicated to the rise in judicial power.  
12 For example, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 in Victoria. On 'statutory', 
or 'Parliamentary Bills of Rights', see Hiebert, supra note 9. 
13 The announcement can be found here: A Little and D Parker, "Government to provide greater 
protection of rights under the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990"(Beehive - The official website of the New 
Zealand Government, 26 February 2018) <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-provide-
greater-protection-rights-under-nz-bill-rights-act-1990> accessed 1 March 2018. 
14 KE Whittington, “In Defense of Legislatures” (2000) 28:5 Political Theory 690 at 690. 
15 J Allan, “Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone” (2008) 45 San Diego Law Review 133 at 
134. 
16 Ibid at 136.  
17 Because, of course, not only could the philosopher's stone be used to create the Elixir of Life, but it 
could transform any metal into pure gold. 
18 Allan, supra note 15 at 134. No doubt one can think of examples of their own. The list given in the 
text is Allan's (apart from Dworkin, whose staying power he expresses some doubt over). 
Kyle L Murray 
Accepted, non-proofed version (4.9.18) 
Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (Vol. 32(1) - February 2019). 
 
4 
 
will lead him safely to this prize,19 but one might also add to this his strong interventions in the 
controversial and topical areas of the legal regulation of hate speech,20 and the moral and legal 
stance on torture in current times.21 This is no easy task, however, and in what follows the story 
I will tell of Waldron's work is quite different. It will be argued that Waldron's tale is not one 
of success, but instead a cautionary one, showing the dangers that lie ahead on this path for 
those who fail to engage properly with debates in moral philosophy.  
These dangers rear their heads in a number of ways in Waldron's thought, all of which, it will 
be suggested, stem from an unconvincing attempt to brush aside core philosophy. Waldron's 
well-known "irrelevance argument" rejects outright the pertinence of the philosophical debate 
surrounding moral objectivity and the status of moral judgements (the "moral realist/anti-
realist" or "objectivist/anti-objectivist debate") to the issue of decision-making authority at the 
heart of constitutionalist debate.22 But, as this paper will argue, this argument, on a number of 
possible interpretations, leads Waldron into incoherence, the most serious of which sees 
Waldron actually become entangled within the debate he claims is irrelevant. But the problems 
of incoherence do not stop there. A closer look at Waldron's scholarship - which at times makes 
explicit, but rather casual, forays into the anti-realist/realist debate - gives rise to a 
problematically inconsistent picture of where he stands on that issue. The problem increases 
further when one tries to piece together the various strands of Waldron's wide-ranging 
scholarship; again, we find that his engagement with core philosophy risks endangering the 
coherence of his thought as a whole. That is problematic in itself, but the issue is not merely 
one of philosophical inconsistency; at times, his stance on the philosophical issue leaves some 
of his key arguments on constitutional authority open to some sharp rejoinders, many of which 
rely on comments that Waldron himself makes, and some of which go to the heart of his work.   
The lesson to be learned from this, it will be argued, is that the path to the philosopher's stone 
must be paved with rigorous and consistent philosophy. One must think, and think carefully, 
about the philosophical implications and background of one's work, and take care in setting 
this out in a clear, thorough and coherent way.  
The argument will unfold as follows: first, some key philosophical concepts will be defined. 
Then, a temporary digression from Waldron's work will take place while the author sets out his 
own anti-realist stance in the philosophical debate at issue - a particular brand of moral 
                                                          
19 Ibid at 134–135. 
20 J Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
21 J Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  For discussion of Waldron's influence in political theory and jurisprudence 
more generally, see  R Stacey, “Democratic Jurisprudence and Judicial Review: Waldron’s Contribution 
to Political Positivism” (2010) 30:4 OJLS 749. 
 
22 This argument first appeared in J Waldron, “The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity” in RP George, ed, 
Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), and largely 
repeated in later work (see J Waldron, “Moral Truth and Judicial Review” (1998) 43 American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 75; Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3, ch 8. 
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scepticism drawing on aspects of the work of the pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty (section 
2). The work done here will be needed for when the article considers some of the consequences 
of anti-realism for the constitutionalist debate - the beginnings of a sequel to Waldron's tale.  
The article will then begin the story of Waldron's lack of (coherent) engagement with the 
philosophical realist/anti-realist issue with a rejection of his irrelevance case, noting the 
inconsistencies it reveals on various possible interpretations (section 3). The next part turns to 
a detailed examination of Waldron's own philosophical position, presenting an holistic, original 
philosophical analysis and deconstruction drawing on various comments made within his 
scholarship (section 4). This is an area of his thought which has to date has received no real 
attention. However, Waldron's meta-ethical stance is one which, especially given the 
unconvincing nature of his irrelevance case, may be of real importance to the strength of his 
constitutionalist projects, and, in the case presented here, to the coherence of his thought more 
generally. The lessons to be learned are also of significance to those involved in both moral 
and constitutional theory more generally. In light of this, the philosophical deconstruction of 
Waldron’s work set out in this paper seeks to make an essential contribution to the literature in 
that area.  
Waldron's arguments on the fundamental constitutionalist issue of decision-making authority 
will then be used as a demonstration of the problems the philosophical issue can cause him – 
which it will be argued are far more than merely trivial issues of theoretical inconsistency. For 
this purpose, Section 5 looks in particular at his criticisms of the popular instrumentalist 
approach to constitutional authority, along with responses to these. It will be contended that 
the answers to Waldron's anti-instrumentalist case, while problematic if one accepts, or remains 
equivocal on, their realist assumptions (both of which Waldron seems to do) lose all force if 
these assumptions are rejected. That will complete the cautionary tale of Waldron and the 
philosopher's stone; the final section will sketch the beginnings of a sequel - on the implications 
of taking an openly anti-realist path in the constitutionalist debate. 
 
2. Prologue: Realism, Anti-Realism, and a Sceptical Perspective 
 
This first section will introduce the key philosophical concepts which will be a central theme 
in the tales which follow - "realism" and "anti-realism". Following this, I will set out my own 
sceptical stance in that philosophical controversy, a necessary first step in some of the later 
arguments made below. For reasons of space, notwithstanding the plethora of contributions to 
this philosophical controversy, only a brief outline of the sceptical perspective, and the grounds 
on which it is held, will be offered.  
 
 
 
 
2.1. Waldron on "Realism" and "Anti-Realism" 
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As Waldron's work is the primary focus of this article, his definitions are a useful point of entry 
into the relevant philosophy. In setting up his irrelevance argument (discussed in the next 
section, below), Waldron states what he means by "realism" and "anti-realism". "Moral 
realism" is defined as the 'claim that some moral judgements are objectively true, while others 
are objectively false'.23 More technically the core realist claim is as follows: 
   
'There are facts which make some moral judgements (that is, some statements of value or 
principle) true and others false, facts which are independent of anyone's beliefs or feelings 
about the matters in question'.24 
 
By "anti-realism", unsurprisingly, Waldron means 'the philosophical denial' of this claim.25 So 
anti-realists 'deny that there are moral facts which determine the truth or falsity of the 
judgements people make'.26 In the absence of such objective matters of fact to render our 
judgements 'correct' or 'incorrect', all we are left with are 'moral judgements and the people 
who make them'.27  
 
Those are, in basic terms, the key players in the realist/anti-realist controversy, and we will 
return to these definitions throughout when examining Waldron's arguments and positions. For 
now, having briefly introduced these broad positions, the perspective taken by the present 
author - itself a form of anti-realism - will be set out.  
 
 
2.2. A Sceptical Perspective  
 
Similar to other brands of scepticism, such as that put forward by James Allan, the approach 
advocated here rejects the notion that there is 'some real, external component to values', or 
'mind-independent' qualities28, with which our beliefs concerning values and morality can and 
should be brought into line. Put another way, 'there are no objective moral values, no moral 
rights and wrongs whose status as such is somehow independent of what other people, or even 
oneself, happen to think or feel'.29 Allan makes this as an apparently empirical claim. He denies 
the existence of these features on the basis that, contrary to what is the case regarding 'factual 
consequences in the natural, causal world', the 'evidence seems...to be against there being any 
                                                          
23 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 164.  
24 Ibid (footnote omitted). There are numerous ways of putting the "realist" position - here Waldron 
relies on the general formulation put by R Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-
Realism, Idealism (London, Routledge, 1989) at 3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 165. 
27 Ibid (italics removed). 
28 J Allan, “A Doubter’s Guide to Law and Natural Rights” (1998) 28 Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review 243 at 245. 
29 J Allan, “Internal and Engaged or External and Detached?” (1999) 12:1 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 5 at 11. 
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such "higher", mind independent values' or 'external, imposed criteria' as regards issues of 
morality and value.30 My scepticism takes a different path: to drop or discard these very ideas. 
That is, to put aside the idea that these qualities exist, rather than to state that they do not, as a 
matter of fact, exist.31 The result is the same - a rejection of the core realist claim, positing the 
existence of moral facts - the argument is different.  
 
 
2.2.1. The World Does Not Speak 
 
The argument is a pragmatic anti-foundationalist one, stemming from the ubiquity of human 
description. Evaluative notions such as "morality" (along with "moral" and "immoral"), 
"rightness" ("right" and "wrong"), "justice" ("just" and "unjust") and other such concepts rife 
in normative discourse, are terms of the human language. As Rorty argues, one consequence 
of this is that only if we imagine the world as either 'itself a real person or as created by a 
person' who spoke this language (God, say) can any sense be made of the idea that any notion 
'has an "intrinsic nature"' or objective content to act as a constraint on how one defines and 
applies it in the claims they make.32 The problem is, it is submitted, an obvious one; '[t]he 
world does not speak. Only we do'.33 So while the 'world is out there...descriptions of the world 
are not';34 the only descriptions, evaluations, and applications of the notions within them 
("right", "wrong" etc) we have are those preferred by particular individuals. Given that it is 
descriptions we are concerned with, this seems to leave us very much on our own, and free to 
describe as we see fit.  
 
It might, however, be pointed out that even if the notions applied in moral claims are creations 
of human language, this does not necessarily make their content freely created and optional. 
Perhaps there is still something independent to serve as a constraint on the way we describe 
and apply these concepts. This is how I read the suggestion made by Upton commenting on 
Rorty's so-called "epistemological nihilism", that even if 'our contact with the extra-mental 
world is contact with something under a description, it does not necessarily follow that all 
descriptions are totally optional'.35 The realist certainly believes so. For the realist, the 
constraint comes from "reality" or "the way things are". The realist - the character Rorty calls 
                                                          
30 Allan, supra note 28 at 246. See also J Allan, Sympathy and Antipathy: Essays Legal and Political 
(Ashgate, 2002) at 89–90. 
31 And actually, the path which leads me to moral scepticism also leads me to harbour some strong 
doubts about the idea of "matters of fact" more generally, such that I am sceptical of Allan's.  That is a 
big claim, which I cannot discuss any further here.  Moral scepticism is big enough for this article. For 
a fearless expounding of a comprehensive anti-foundationalism extending beyond moral philosophy 
and into other pursuits like science, mathematics and general epistemology see R Rorty, Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1980) (especially Part II). 
32 R Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 21. 
33 Ibid at 6. 
34 Ibid at 5. 
35 TV Upton, “Rorty’s Epistemological Nihilism” (1987) 3:2 The Personalist Forum 141 at 149. 
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the 'metaphysician' - does 'not believe that anything can be made to look good or bad by being 
redescribed', or, if they do, 'they deplore this fact and cling to the idea that reality will help us 
resist such seductions'.36 They cling to the idea that 'deep down beneath all the texts, there is 
something which is not just one more text but that to which various texts are trying to be 
"adequate"'.37 That maybe we are not so alone after all.  
 
However, the ubiquity of language now becomes a problem, leading to a larger, sceptical, 
argument against such realist ideas of a "reality", "way things are" or objective properties 
beyond the beliefs of individuals to appeal to as a constraint on their acceptability; holding on 
to such ideas is pointless. The 'attempt to get behind appearance' and our own preferred 
descriptions to some kind of independent "way things are" is, as Rorty puts it, 'hopeless'.38 The 
problem is that 'there is nothing to be known about anything save what is stated in sentences 
describing it'.39 This point can be traced back to Wittgenstein, who pointed out that it is 'only 
in language that we can mean something by something',40 such that there is 'no way to think 
about either the world or our purposes' except through language.41 Thus there is, again as Rorty 
puts, 'no way to divide' the "reality", or whatever within it is the focus of our comments, 'in 
itself from our ways of talking about' it.42 And with that, the realist project is doomed. 
"Objective reality" - a "way things are" independent of belief, or what one happens to think - 
becomes the name 'of something unknowable'.43 Putting this idea to use involves the 
'impossible attempt' to step outside of our preferred descriptions and compare them with 
'something absolute' - something which is more than another such description.44 The pragmatic 
point here is that treating as a goal of inquiry, or constraint, something which is unknowable 
means that there is no way of establishing when the goal has been reached, or recognising when 
the constraint is being violated, and that this renders the exercise unworkable and pointless. 
The very idea of an objective "reality" and the like - ground independent of belief - along with 
the idea that our claims can be seen as attempting to accurately represent or approximate 
something beyond themselves, is thus set aside on the grounds that it fuels such a pointless and 
unworkable exercise.  
  
To put this all into some context, this line of thought leads the sceptic to oppose suggestions 
that moral claims, 'like any other factual belief', present claims 'about the world which can be 
assessed...as true or false'.45 The idea that we can, as one moral realist puts it, 'detect moral 
                                                          
36 Rorty, supra note 32 at 75. 
37 R Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982) at xxxvii. 
38 R Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999) at 49. 
39 Ibid at 54. 
40 L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953) at 18. 
41 Rorty, supra note 37 at xix. 
42 Rorty, supra note 38 at xvii. 
43 Ibid at 49. 
44 Rorty, supra note 37 at xix. 
45 M Platts, “Moral Reality” in G Sayre-McCord, ed, Essays on Moral Realism (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988) at 282. 
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aspects' of the world and situations within it 'in the same way we detect (nearly all) other 
aspects: by looking and seeing', and that as long as we pay 'careful attention to the world' while 
doing so we can 'improve our beliefs...make them more approximately true'46 is precisely the 
kind of exercise I suggest we set aside.  One cannot be sure that what one is "detecting" or 
"seeing" is anything more than the meaning we give to "the world" or the so-called "moral 
aspects" within it. The process of paying careful attention to the world, the moral facts, reality 
etc, cannot be shown to amount to anything more than paying attention to our own preferred 
descriptions. With ultimately nothing beyond the preferred descriptions of individuals and 
groups to be appealed to, all that remains are the competing claims and beliefs themselves, and 
those who make them.  
 
2.2.2. All by Myself: Despair or Freedom? 
 
With all that, I see the situation in much the same way as Arthur Leff in concluding his classic 
article on the defensibility of normative propositions. As he put it, in characteristically blunt 
fashion: 'it looks as if we are all we have'.47 To many, this is a frightening prospect. Indeed, 
Leff himself was moved to end that article with a despairing poem, finishing with the plea: 
'God help us'.48 Moore saw this as evidence of the 'emotional dejection' he claims 'many people 
experience if they come to believe the truth of moral skepticism'.49 Given Leff's career moves 
following that article, it is hard to disagree with that assessment; he devoted the rest of his life 
to the task of writing a legal dictionary, working at such a pace that, as he admitted, he would 
not complete until the 'year 2075'50 -  which sounds very much like saying it is something he 
never would, and never wanted to, complete. Quite an intellectual crisis.51  
 
That apparent debilitation was from someone who openly accepted the sceptical premise; 
however the biggest fears are expressed by those who vehemently oppose it. As one 
commentator aptly notes, it is a common tendency of the believers in moral truth to suggest 
that it is the sceptic's anti-realist views that are 'responsible for the Hitlers of the world and the 
sociopaths among us - not to mention the...garden-variety prevaricators, confidence men, and 
swindlers'.52 Indeed, it seems to be something of a self-assigned mission taken up by many to 
'save the world from the horrible acts that are supposed to result when people become moral 
                                                          
46 Ibid at 285. 
47 A Leff, “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law” (1979) 6 Duke Law Journal 1229 at 1249. 
48 Ibid. 
49 MS Moore, “Moral Reality Revisited” (1992) 90:8 Michigan Law Review 2424 at 2449, n79. 
50 SZ Leff, “Some Notes About Art’s Dictionary” (1985) 94:8 Yale Law Journal 1850 at 1850. 
51 See further PE Johnson, “Nihilism and the End of Law” (1993) 31 First Things 19. The point in the 
text is that Leff apparently intended to leave the worlds of legal and moral philosophy behind for good. 
However, as it happened, Leff's career was irreversibly cut short due to his untimely death from cancer 
in 1981. What work might or might not have followed is therefore an unfortunate matter of speculation.  
52 EM Gander, The Last Conceptual Revolution: A Critique of Richard Rorty’s Political Philosophy 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) at 51. 
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skeptics of any variety'.53 A first hand example of this tendency is Leo Strauss' bizarre, but no 
doubt sincere, concern that a rejection of natural right and wrong will lead to the breakdown of 
'civilised life', and even 'cannibalism'.54 Ronald Dworkin was another well-intentioned 
defender of civilisation; he sought to defend our ability to 'live decent, worthwhile lives', and 
build communities which are 'fair and good' against what he called the 'denigrating suggestions' 
of moral scepticism.55 However bizarre this all may sound, it seems there are many people in 
this world who take comfort in the idea of the constraints of objective truth and its ability to 
protect us against such evils - to protect us from ourselves - and who cling to such metaphysical 
blankets.  
 
I do not mean to belittle all this. The popularity of metaphysical blankets is perhaps 
understandable; history has shown us the evils humanity can do, and we continue to see this 
almost every day it seems. Whatever helps you sleep at night. I do, however, see these concerns, 
when directed against scepticism specifically, as misguided, to say the least. I see no logical or 
empirical connection between rejecting the idea of objective truth, and the holding of 
dangerous, violent or uncivilised tendencies. If anything, plenty of evidence may be found to 
suggest it works the other way.56 
 
While this article does not purport to set out a full justification for the sceptical stance taken 
(quite a task, which would require at least a full article in its own right), rather simply to explain 
what it is, it can perhaps be briefly noted that there is an alternative and brighter perspective on 
where the rejection of moral realism leaves us. Rather than a cause for despair, or fear, the 
discarding of objective moral truth may be seen as something liberating. The rejection of the 
realist conception of objective truth leaves us free. It leaves us free to describe, evaluate - to 
create - as we see fit. In a sceptical world of optional description, we bow down to no authority 
other than ourselves; not "Truth", "the way things are", "God" or any other metaphysical 
authority in which many people seem to take comfort. For if morality is the construct of 
language, and we discard the idea that there is anything to which our descriptions are trying to 
be adequate, then each individual themselves steps into these metaphysical shoes - the shoes 
that God once filled - and becomes the supreme moral legislator. Thus, on the sceptical, anti-
realist view I put forward, the individual becomes, to borrow a term from Leff, a Godlet.57 Like 
                                                          
53 W Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 13. 
54 L Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) at 3. 
55 R Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” (1996) 25:2 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 87 at 139. 
56 The plethora of religious wars and tensions throughout the world, historically and today - the Christian 
crusades, Catholic-Protestant violence; Sunnis and Shia; Jews and Muslims in Israel and Palestine - to 
name but a few. Such worldviews, with their attachment to the idea of independently-given 
unquestionable rules of conduct and the consequent moral certainty and rectitude of their actions, are 
clearly far from the idea of scepticism. Think also of the acts committed by various totalitarian regimes 
in the 20th Century; these were not obviously premised on the sceptical idea that there are no objectively 
right answers or natural right - quite the opposite.  
57 Leff, supra note 47 at 1235–1237. 
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Gods, their utterances - their evaluations and normative statements - are performative: they do 
not 'describe facts or conform to them but instead constitute[] them, create[]  them'.58 What is 
declared to be "right", "good", "bad", is just that, because it has been so declared. This 
liberation and empowerment is, as far as I can tell, far from the "denigrating" of "worthwhile" 
lives and communities.  
 
 
3. Really Irrelevant? The Incoherence of Waldron's Irrelevance Thesis 
 
We can now begin the first chapter of Waldron's cautionary tale - his irrelevance case. This 
holds that 'the truth or falsity of moral realism makes no difference to the justification of 
judicial review' of legislation on rights grounds.59 Put the other way around, shifting the focus 
from the legal branches to the political, this also entails that the realist/anti-realist issue makes 
no difference to the justification of leaving issues concerning rights and morality to be 
determined ultimately by the elected political branches.  
 
This is a big claim, of some consequence (perhaps surprise) to those theorists who engage in 
the age-old philosophical realist/anti-realist controversy, and especially to those who also take 
sides in the constitutional debate. As should be clear from this article, I am someone who does 
precisely that. As a moral sceptic and contributor to the constitutionalist debate over where and 
how decision-making power in society should be distributed and exercised, I am one of the 
many directly caught by Waldron's irrelevance claim. So it seems that, when wearing my 
sceptical hat, I have little, if anything, of interest to say on the issue of constitutional review, 
or, more fundamentally, decision-making authority within a constitutional system. Fortunately, 
however, Waldron's argument fails. The point of this section, then, is that Waldron's attempt to 
deflect the challenge of philosophy - to downplay its significance to constitutional theory - is 
unsuccessful. Not only that, but the reason it fails leads Waldron straight into the curse of 
incoherence. 
 
3.1. Waldron's Irrelevance Argument 
 
Given Waldron's longstanding opposition to strong judicial review, it should come as no 
surprise that he largely argues for his claim of the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist 
controversy on the basis that it makes 'no difference' to his conclusion that the 'practice of 
judicial review of legislation' on rights grounds cannot be justified.60 Specifically, in 'The 
                                                          
58 Ibid at 1231. 
59 Waldron, supra note 22 at 77.  See also Waldron, ‘The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity’ (fn16), and 
most recently Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3, ch 8. There are slight differences and 
nuances in the way this argument is presented within these, but these need not concern us here; the 
fundamental thrust of his argument, that it is disagreement and arbitrariness that are the real concerns, 
remains the same. What follows concerning the technical details of Waldron's argument will draw 
largely upon the relevant chapter of Law and Disagreement, as the more recent formulation. 
60 Waldron, supra note 22 at 76. 
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Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity',61 Waldron argues for the irrelevance of the philosophical 
issue on the grounds that it makes no difference to the conclusion that judicial decision-making 
on the controversial moral issues implicated in rights protection is 'arbitrary'.62 Waldron's point 
here is that 'moral decision-making in law is likely to be as arbitrary...for a moral realist as it is 
for any opponent of moral objectivity'.63 As 'arbitrariness is there, on either meta-ethical 
account', the realist/anti-realist issue makes no difference, and is therefore irrelevant to, the 
issue of the (lack of) justification for judicial review of legislation on rights grounds, and the 
appropriateness of the moral decision-making it requires of judges.64  
 
For Waldron there are three senses in which moral decision-making by unelected judges - 
where 'a judge sometimes has to assert his [or her] view of what is right over the view taken by 
a legislature or electorate'65 - might be seen as "arbitrary": it may be '"unpredictable"', or 
perhaps '"unreasoned".66 But Waldron’s main concern is with 'explaining the democratic 
legitimacy'67 or 'political legitimacy'68 of this. The decisions of judges, determining issues of 
'social principle and value', lack 'authority or legitimacy' over the determinations of those issues 
by elected legislators, or the people themselves.69 This is the charge of "arbitrariness" that 
concerns Waldron and which he devotes a large proportion of Law and Disagreement, and 
much of his other work, to pressing home.70 Whether any, and if so which, of these concerns 
about the "arbitrariness" of moral decision-making by judges are convincing is not directly 
relevant for present purposes. The argument of concern here is a relative one; his point is that 
if judicial decision-making is arbitrary (as he thinks it is), then it remains so, regardless of 
whether a realist or anti-realist philosophical approach is taken. It is the way Waldron supports 
this point, it will be suggested, that is problematic.  
 
To show that moral decision-making by judges remains "arbitrary" on both a realist and anti-
realist approach, Waldron casts the situation in what he describes as realist and anti-realist 
terms. So for Waldron, 'if moral realism is true', then it would be accurate to say that 'what the 
judge is imposing on his [or her] fellow citizens...is a belief of his [or hers] about the moral 
facts'.71  In an anti-realist world, the judge would be imposing their mere 'subjective 
preference[s]'.72 The idea that judges would be imposing their own subjective preferences and 
attitudes on society is often, Waldron notes, treated as the cause for concern. But for Waldron, 
                                                          
61 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3, ch 8. 
62 Ibid at 170. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid at 186. 
65 Ibid at 184. 
66 Ibid at 168. 
67 Ibid at 184. 
68 Ibid at 168 (emphasis removed). 
69 Ibid.  
70 See supra note 3, for examples. 
71 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 184. 
72 Ibid. 
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it is not their metaphysical status that is the real reason for this discomfort. Even if realism 
were the case, judicial imposition would still be problematic because the determinations of 
others - 'legislators and voters' for example - could equally be conceptualised in the way the 
realist would conceive of judicial decision-making; they too reflect 'their beliefs about the 
moral facts'.73  Waldron's crucial point here is about the reason this apparent symmetry, even 
on the realist account, is a problem:  
 
'in the absence of any account of how one could tell which of two conflicting beliefs about 
the moral facts is more accurate, the imposition of one person's or a few people's beliefs 
over those of the population at large still seems arbitrary and undemocratic'.74 
 
Essentially, the concern seems to be that if both legislators and judges have their views about 
what the moral facts are and what they require, and if there are no means of establishing who 
has got it right - so that they are ultimately of equal epistemological weight - then why should 
the views of a few judges prevail?75 If one accepts that there is "an absence of any account" of 
how to distinguish accurate (or more accurate) moral beliefs from inaccurate (or less accurate) 
ones, then, Waldron tells us, judicial decision-making is "arbitrary". So Waldron's irrelevance 
argument hinges on this premise that there is indeed "an absence of any" such account, even 
leaving the realist premise untouched. This is the key to, but also the undoing of, Waldron's 
attempt to deflect the realist/anti-realist philosophical issue. 
 
3.2. The Incoherence of Waldron's Irrelevance Argument  
 
Waldron's premise is open to a number of interpretations, and is problematic for different 
reasons depending on which is taken. All of them, however, it will be argued, lead Waldron 
into an apparent incoherence of some kind.  
 
Taken literally, Waldron's key premise concerning the "absence of any account" of how to 
distinguish accurate from inaccurate moral beliefs, even presuming the cogency of moral 
realism, can be quickly dismissed. If Waldron means to report that there is no test at all for the 
accuracy of moral beliefs, it can instantly be replied that this is simply not the case. As Smith 
points out, there are a plethora of accounts (given by moral realists) of how to determine 'which 
moral beliefs are objectively true'.76 Smith notes a range of examples, but I would add that 
Waldron himself mentions such accounts just a few pages earlier when he notes that, for 
example, a realist utilitarian 'will claim that the development of a utilitarian ethics' represents 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 This is a point which could equally be put the other way around - why should the views of legislators 
prevail if they cannot be established as epistemologically superior? In fact, it is my view - based on my 
sceptical philosophy - that no one's moral beliefs can be established as epistemologically superior, so 
why should anyone's prevail?  
76 D Smith, “The Use of Meta-Ethics in Adjudication” (2003) 23:1 OJLS 25 at 39.  
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'progress towards the truth'.77 So if this is what Waldron means by the premise of his irrelevance 
argument, it simply cannot be maintained. 
 
However, that Waldron himself mentions such accounts in the relevant chapter of Law and 
Disagreement should probably point us away from this literal interpretation. Waldron surely 
would have noticed the clear contradiction here. A more tenable interpretation, then, would be 
another one identified by Smith: that there is an absence of any 'successful' or 'plausible' 
account how to determine which moral beliefs are objectively true, rather than of any account 
at all.78 There is also evidence to support this interpretation. For example, Waldron writes that 
'though they [realists] insist that there is some fact of the matter, they offer nothing which would 
help distinguish a mere arbitrary opinion from a well-grounded belief.'79 The words I have 
emphasised here suggest that Waldron's criticism is that, while realists may well offer some 
purported means of distinguishing mere arbitrary opinions from well-justified beliefs, the 
means they do offer are, it turns out, unhelpful for that purpose. Likewise, Waldron 
immediately follows his mention of the realist utilitarian who 'will claim that the development 
of a utilitarian ethics...is progress towards the truth' with the objection that 'there is nothing he 
can say to so support these claims'.80 So here Waldron's problem with realist theorists seems 
to be that they cannot back up their claims to epistemological authority - they cannot 
convincingly establish their claims to have a theory providing a sound means to moral truth, 
which can then be used to decide between competing beliefs. Waldron appears to make 
something like this explicit in his forceful critique of modern moral realists that, while they 
believe their claims to be descriptive in nature, 'they are quite unable to demonstrate the truth 
of their judgements, or show how they correspond to moral reality', and that they should 
therefore qualify their substantive moral claims with the rider that it is '"only my opinion"'.81 
 
Whether or not a claim delivers on its promises - can be supported, certified, or adequately 
demonstrated - is an evaluative judgement; it involves an assessment of the validity of whatever 
claims to moral truth realists make. As should be clear by now, Waldron's negative assessments 
are all ones I wholeheartedly endorse. That is not the problem here. The problem is that these 
are not claims it is open to Waldron to make in the course of an irrelevance case. As Tasioulas 
points out, Waldron's argument 'focuses on the implications of what, on anyone's view, must 
be a serious defect' in the realist position; the 'putative absence of a reliable' means of 
identifying moral truths.82 Pointing to such a fundamental defect in realism seems 
'indistinguishable from an attack' on realist theories,83 and even the very idea of realism itself 
                                                          
77 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 179. 
78 Smith, supra note 76 at 39. (emphasis added). 
79 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 180 (emphasis added). 
80 Ibid at 179. 
81 Ibid at 180 (emphases added). See also 186 (no beliefs about moral facts 'can be certified as superior 
or naturally prevalent on any credentials other than the fact that some people find them congenial'). 
82 J Tasioulas, “The Legal Relevance of Ethical Objectivity” (2002) 47 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 211 at 239. 
83 Smith, supra note 76 at 106. 
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(depending on how literally one takes the words "can" and "unable" in Waldron's comments 
above). Indeed this is the reason Waldron's points sound so attractive to those who, like the 
author, are moral sceptics. 
 
But while an anti-realist would be more than happy to accept Waldron's point about the 
unfulfilled promise of realism, realists themselves will obviously be rather less keen. At the 
very least, those realists putting forward their own favoured moral theories, and, as Waldron 
himself notes, which they regard as facilitating 'progress towards the truth' and relying on 'basic 
propositions' which are 'true', would surely not accept that there is 'nothing [they] can say to 
support these claims',84 or that they are unable to demonstrate their truth. If such realists thought 
their claims to moral objectivity, and to a convincing means of establishing that status, were 
not, and more fundamentally could not be supported, then surely they would not advance them 
at all. So for a realist to be able to accept Waldron's irrelevance claim it seems that they would 
have to forgo their realism. If this is the case, then Waldron's irrelevance argument necessarily 
becomes entangled in the debate he claims to be irrelevant in the very process of establishing 
that it is irrelevant. This is self-defeating. 
 
Waldron might respond that his premise of the lack of any (plausible) account of how to 
distinguish accurate from inaccurate moral beliefs is epistemological only. That is, it relies only 
on a claimed absence of the lack of a successful means of accessing moral truth, which, strictly 
speaking, leaves the issue of the existence of moral truth untouched. Waldron could fall back 
on his initial definition of "realism" here and point out that, as he sees it, realism is an entirely 
metaphysical claim that 'there are facts which make some moral judgements...true and others 
false'; facts which do exist independently of belief.85 Rejecting the idea that we can access these 
moral truths says nothing of this core realist claim as to their existence, and therefore cannot, 
strictly speaking, be characterised as an anti-realist position. If this is Waldron's response, it 
would be beneficial for him to clarify this, in order to avoid the problems above. However, the 
difficulties with attributing this strictly metaphysical view of realism and anti-realism in light 
of his other work are discussed in the next section below (see especially section 4.2).86  
                                                          
84 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 179. 
85 Ibid (footnote omitted, and emphasis added).  
86 The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pushing this possibility. Others have taken issue 
with this possible interpretation of Waldron's claim on the basis that only the most implausible versions 
of realism separate meta-ethics and epistemology in such an extreme way. As Smith puts it, most realists 
'do not simply assert that a form of [realism] is correct', but also 'make specific claims about the nature 
of objective moral truth' including 'at least the outlines of an epistemology' (Smith, supra note 76 at 40.. 
See also Tasioulas, supra note 82 at 219. If correct, these criticisms would not refute Waldron's 
argument; he can continue to insist that when he attacks their epistemology he leaves their metaphysical 
claim, and therefore their realism, standing. They would show his irrelevance argument to be itself 
largely irrelevant to the way realism actually looks. But on his own terms, Waldron's claim would stand. 
The difficulty I discuss below concerns how this interpretation would fit with what Waldron has 
previously said on the subject of realism and anti-realism in his earlier work. 
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Anticipating that argument for the moment, for the different elements of Waldron's engagement 
with philosophy to hang together, it seems that something has to give. Because of this, it is not 
clear that this interpretation is one that Waldron would want to take.87   
Thus, on each of the interpretations of Waldron's irrelevance case considered above, his key 
premise leads him into some form of incoherence; or at least it is not clear how he can avoid it 
doing so. This is important in its own right for anyone concerned with applying core philosophy 
to constitutional theory, but in the context of the argument of this article it has a particular 
significance; it marks a failed attempt to deflect the philosophical issue, or at the very least a 
failure to engage adequately and coherently with it.  
 
4. The Plot Thickens: Waldron's Stance on the Realist/Anti-Realist Issue - A Tale of 
Two Waldrons? 
 
The fact that Waldron has often argued that this fundamental issue of moral philosophy is 
irrelevant to his constitutionalist case has not stopped him making a number of forays into 
exactly this issue in his work. Leaving aside the irrelevance thesis for the moment, it is these 
forays  themselves that are the subject of this section. Pinning down the stance of a theorist as 
prominent and influential as Waldron is not only of philosophical interest, however; having 
questioned the coherence of his irrelevance case above, his own stance in the perhaps not-so-
irrelevant debate comes back into the frame for constitutional theorists.  
 
Yet while Waldron's irrelevance argument has received some attention, and, of course, 
considerable attention has been paid to his anti-judicial review, pro-legislature argument in the 
constitutionalist debate, Waldron's own stance in the philosophical controversy has received 
very little. Indeed, to the extent that it has been looked at, it has taken the form of a mere 
footnote-length glance. 
                                                          
87 A final way out would be to interpret Waldron's key premise in light of his general concern with 
disagreement in politics. On this interpretation, Waldron's premise regarding the absence of any account 
of how to tell accurate from inaccurate moral beliefs would be read as the absence of any successful 
account, where "successful" means "capable of resolving disagreement". This would explain why 
Waldron sees it as significant that, unlike in science, there is nothing in the realm of moral theory that 
'even begins to connect the idea of there being a fact of the matter with the idea of there being some 
way to proceed when some people disagree' (Waldron, Law and Disagreement supra note 3 at 178). 
However, this would require Waldron to rely on an account of political justification that is 
straightforwardly self-defeating; if a claim can be dismissed merely because others are not convinced 
to accept it, then that claim itself can be dismissed, because there are plenty who object strongly to such 
a conception of valid justification (see Smith, supra note 76 at 44. The realist instrumentalists 
considered below in section 5 to name but a few). On this ground, Waldron's irrelevance case would 
fall quite quickly into incoherence. As such it is even less plausible than the interpretation considered 
above. For this reason, although it is certainly a possible interpretation of Waldron's key premise, it is 
not one that will be pursued further. In any case, the number of interpretations his irrelevance case is 
open to is itself problematic, and enough to support the current argument. 
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For example, in the article in which he made the favourable comments on Waldron's work 
(quoted earlier), Allan briefly notes, in a couple of footnotes, that Waldron is a 'self-proclaimed 
noncognitivist in the moral realm', and holds that there 'are no mind-independent truths' in this 
area.88 Aileen Kavanagh deals with Waldron's philosophy in a similarly cursory footnote. But 
her interpretation is quite different - quite the opposite, in fact. For she takes it as read that, 
while some would regard the idea of a '"morally right"' decision dubious, Waldron does not.89 
Her assumption that 'there is such a thing as a morally right and wrong decision', independently 
of what people happen to think is, she states, 'not in contention with Waldron'.90  
 
That Allan has Waldron down as an anti-realist, and Kavanagh takes it as read that he is the 
opposite, should give us immediate pause for thought. At the very least, it suggests that a closer 
look at Waldron's stance is needed. It is also a spoiler as to the case made in this section – one 
of apparent inconsistency, or at least a problematic lack of clarity because, as discussed below, 
there is evidence supporting both of these interpretations of Waldron's philosophical stance, 
and it is not clear how they can, or should, be reconciled.91 
 
4.1. A Tale of Two (Or More?) Waldrons 
 
Allan's treatment of Waldron's philosophical stance is understandably brief. He was, after all, 
relying on Waldron's own declaration. In an article on moral truth, rights, and judicial review, 
prior to the publication of Law and Disagreement,92 Waldron expressly tells us that one of the 
views he holds is anti-realism. He points to sceptics such as Hume and Hare as providing the 
'accounts of moral judgment [he] find[s] most convincing'.93 And, to avoid any room for doubt, 
Waldron writes of anti-realists in the first person; one 'of the views that I hold [is] anti-
realism';94 'we...discover that there is simply no room for realist conceptions like moral truth 
and moral objectivity, and we put those ideas quietly and untendentiously aside'.95 Even more 
                                                          
88 Allan, supra note 15 at 141, n30. See also 141, n33 ('Waldron sees moral evaluations in terms of 
sentiments, not in terms of claimed true beliefs').  
89 Kavanagh, supra note 1 at 460, n30. 
90 Ibid. 
91 For another brief look at Waldron's stance - again, confined to a footnote - see  Enoch, supra note 5 
at 30, n20. (suggesting that Waldron, 'at times sounds like an antirealist'). Enoch's treatment is slightly 
more promising in that he recognises that 'much more needs to be said on the relation between 
metaethics and political philosophy in general, and in Waldron's political philosophy in particular'. 
However, as far as I am aware, he has not himself returned to the subject. The analysis presented here 
is a much-needed contribution to that task.  
92 Waldron, supra note 22.This article also contains a version of Waldron's irrelevance case. 
93 Ibid at 75, n1. 
94 Ibid at 77 (emphasis added). 
95 Ibid at 78 (emphases added). Note also the precursor to this quote: 'Some philosophers (me, for 
example) find first that emotivist or prescriptivist patterns of analysis provide what appear to be the best 
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strongly, Waldron writes that, 'for us non-cognitivists...the realist is making some wretchedly 
misbegotten category-mistake in assimilating moral judgments to judgments about matters of 
fact'.96 Reading this article, putting his first-person alignment with anti-realism, anti-realists, 
and anti-realist ideas together with his open rejection of realist concepts, gives one the 
impression that Waldron is indeed a trenchant anti-realist. In fact, that last comment above 
would make a worthy rallying call for all anti-realists. So Allan seems justified in his rather 
brief noting of Waldron's anti-realist stance.  
 
Unfortunately matters are not that straightforward. In the chapter of Law and Disagreement 
where the latest formulation of the irrelevance arguments rejected above are found, Waldron 
seems to want to distance himself from the anti-realist school of thought. There, one finds 
statements like; 'of the various views about justice and rights that compete in our society, surely 
some are more acceptable than others', and that '[s]urely...some of them are true and others 
false'.97 At least that is what he describes as 'a philosophical possibility'.98  
 
Even if Waldron merely considers it to be a "philosophical possibility" here, that is already a 
large step back from the hostility shown to realism in the earlier article just noted: the 
accusation that realists are "wretchedly misbegotten" in viewing moral claims as statements 
about matters of fact does not seem to entertain any such possibility, however slim. Gone too 
are the first-person attachments to the anti-realist position. For example, when defining anti-
realism here, he writes that '[t]hey deny that there are moral facts which determine the truth or 
falsity of the judgements people make', and, in a sentence otherwise strikingly similar to that 
found earlier, Waldron writes that 'they...discover that there is no room for any realist notion 
of moral truth and moral objectivity, and they put those ideas quietly aside'.99 It is now they (no 
longer we) who are the anti-realists. 
 
The absence of the explicit attacks on realism from his previous article on moral truth and 
judicial review, along with this shift from the first to the third-person regarding anti-realists, 
particularly in some claims otherwise identical, could suggest a number of things. It might 
simply represent the full flowering of Waldron's irrelevance case. Given his view that the 
realist/anti-realist debate is of no consequence to the constitutionalist issue, he would 
presumably see his own stance in that debate as irrelevant. Indeed, if he is at all convinced by 
his irrelevance case he must see his own philosophical stance as irrelevant. Seeing his own 
philosophical views as inconsequential, Waldron may simply see no need to mention them; 
those views would not (again, as they should not) add anything to his irrelevance argument. In 
light of this, he may have wondered why he ever saw the need to mention them. However, 
                                                          
accounts available of what is going on when moral judgments are made and thought about and 
followed.' 
96 Ibid at 78–79. 
97 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 164 (emphasis added).  
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid at 176. (emphases added). 
Kyle L Murray 
Accepted, non-proofed version (4.9.18) 
Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (Vol. 32(1) - February 2019). 
 
19 
 
while this might explain the absence of explicit attacks on realism, and the change of phrasing, 
we would still be left with the apparent embracing of the idea of moral truth noted above 
("surely some of them are true and others false"). 
 
So it seems this explanation will not do. An alternative that would explain both the shift away 
from explicit hostility to realism, and the sympathy now shown to their cause (at least 
entertaining it as a possibility), is that Waldron has changed his mind. It is possible that, by the 
time of Law and Disagreement, Waldron is no longer so convinced that realism makes some 
"wretchedly misbegotten mistake", and that he no longer sees anti-realism as more convincing. 
Thus, the apparent differences in Waldron's position, and in tone, may represent nothing more 
than a change of heart on the philosophical issue.  As briefly noted above, some commentators 
do take it as read that, at this point at least, Waldron is ultimately a realist, and thinks that there 
are such things as moral facts regarding moral rights and wrongs, accepting realist concepts 
like "moral truth" and "moral objectivity".  
 
Further weight might be added to this explanation for the apparent tale of two Waldrons by 
looking at evidence from his more recent work. In a rigorous formulation of his "core case" 
against judicial review, Waldron writes that '[b]ecause rights are important, it is likewise 
important that we get them right', leading him to concede that we must therefore 'take outcome-
related' justifications put forward in the constitutionalist debate 'very seriously indeed.'100 
Instrumentalist approaches, and the significance of that concession and others like it, will be 
returned to in the next section. For now, the point is that this again sounds like realist-talk; 
getting issues of rights "right" sounds, especially in light of his earlier comments about there 
being "true" and "false" positions on these moral matters, like realist-talk. This is certainly how 
Hutchinson takes Waldron at this point. He reads comments like these, and others which see 
Waldron intimate the importance of choosing procedures that 'are most likely to get at the truth 
about rights' (or at least briefly entertain such suggestions),101 as insisting that 'there is some 
objective ground or moral facts-of-the-matter' where rights are concerned.102 
 
There does seem to be something in this; an anti-realist would certainly not entertain comments 
such as these, yet alone show sympathy to their concern for reaching "right answers", or getting 
"at the truth about rights". On our view - on the view of anti-realism as defined by Waldron 
earlier103 - there is no (objective) "truth" to be had, making this a hopeless dead end, rather than 
- as Waldron puts it - an 'honourable approach' taking the 'possibility' of reaching the 'wrong 
answer' to substantive questions of rights, 'very seriously'.104 In valuing the approach of "getting 
                                                          
100 Waldron, "Core of the Case", supra note 3 at 1373. 
101 As discussed below, he dismisses these approaches on the grounds that they turn out to be question-
begging in circumstances of disagreement. He does not reject the possibility that one side to this 
disagreement might actually have "moral truth" on their side. 
102 AC Hutchinson, “A ‘Hard Core’ Case Against Judicial Review” (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 
Forum 57 at 58. 
103 See above, p6. 
104 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 252. 
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things right", therefore, Waldron does seem to imply the existence of objective moral truth; 
conceptualising rights as 'objective moral entities'.105  
 
Further such claims can also be found in Waldron's later work on the absolute moral and legal 
indefensibility of torture. In his consideration of what Christian teaching can add to this debate, 
Waldron sees it as 'reassuring' that 'secular moral thought can make sense of the objectivity of 
value'.106 But not only is Waldron comforted by the attachment of moral theory to those realist 
concepts he once lambasted as "wretchedly misbegotten", he wants more. The Christian 
perspective on torture, which he 'yearned for'107 in the debate post-9/11 is, again, to use his own 
words, 'a form of radical objectivity that goes beyond common-or-garden moral realism'.108 
This yearning, and this desire to place such a radical form of realism more prominently in the 
moral debate on torture seems a world away from putting the realist concepts of moral truth 
and objectivity aside, as the anti-realist Waldron once did. 
 
All of this might suggest that the later Waldron has, finally, come down - and come down big 
time - on the side of realism (whether he will change his mind again -  if indeed he has done so 
- is of course another matter).  
 
If this "change of mind" explanation is taken, however, one should probably be aware that this 
would not be first time Waldron would appear to have done so. In an article published several 
years before 'Moral Truth and Judicial Review' (the article which saw Waldron openly align 
himself with anti-realism), one finds statements which again seem to align him with the realist 
case, cast in realist terminology, using realist concepts - the very same terminology and 
concepts rejected by Waldron in the later article. Criticising Freeman's instrumental defence of 
judicial review,109 Waldron raises the likely possibility of disagreement, where 'a number of 
citizens think a piece of legislation respects and even advances fundamental rights' while others 
'believe it unjustifiably encroaches on rights'.110 In such a situation, he states, 'no doubt from a 
God's-eye point of view, one of these positions is ultimately true and the other false'.111 The 
idea of a "God's-eye point of view", and that judgements concerning rights can "no doubt" be 
"true" and others "false" are, as discussed earlier, typically realist ones. They require the idea 
of independent content to moral values and evaluations; having this independent content, it is 
not down to any individual to decide what is right or wrong. God says; the world says; the 
thing-in-itself-says; the intrinsic nature of reality, or whatever metaphor one can find to make 
this realist-foundationalist point, says.  
                                                          
105 Hutchinson, supra note 102 at 58. 
106 Waldron, supra note 21 at 269. 
107 Ibid at 261. 
108 Ibid at 269. 
109 S Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review” (1990) 9:4 Law and 
Philosophy 327. Instrumentalist approaches to constitutional authority are discussed in the next section 
below.  
110 J Waldron, “Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review” (1994) 13:1 Law and Philosophy 27 at 36. 
111 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, they are typically realist ones according to Waldron's own definitions. Consider 
the technical definition of realism from  Law and Disagreement quoted earlier (in Section 2): 
to claim that from a "God's-eye point of view" a moral position is true or false is to claim that 
there are moral facts independent of our belief which render moral judgements true or false. 
Recall that in 'Moral Truth and Judicial Review', Waldron states that 'we [anti-realists] discover 
that there is simply no room for realist conceptions like moral truth and moral objectivity, and 
that we put those ideas quietly and untendentiously aside',112 and in 'The Irrelevance of Moral 
Objectivity' that 'they [anti-realists]...discover that there is no room for any realist notion of 
moral truth and moral objectivity'.113 In these descriptions of the anti-realist position, Waldron 
sees "moral truth" as a "realist notion". If "moral truth" is a realist notion, and if the issue of 
rights is (as Waldron characterises it) a moral one,114 then the idea that one position in the moral 
disagreement over rights likely to arise is "true" and others "false" is clearly a realist idea. This 
earlier Waldron accepts (and with "no doubt" - which is far from "putting aside") the very 
realist notions the later Waldron we came across rejects as an anti-realist.  So if Waldron has 
changed his mind, he seems to have done so several times; from realism to anti-realism, and 
back again.  
 
 
4.2. The Difficulty of Putting Waldron Together Again 
 
Which of these possible explanations for the inconsistencies in Waldron's stance is the "correct" 
one remains unknowable. Ultimately it is only Waldron himself who can know his own 
position(s) and reasoning with certainty.  It might be that all of the comments mentioned above 
can be clarified in a way which shows them to be perfectly compatible with one another. One 
possibility is that Waldron might believe that there is such a thing as "moral truth" out there, 
but only that we cannot ever find it, or be sure of when we are or are not finding it. Perhaps 
there is truth out there, but we can never achieve it, because of our own limited capacities, 
cognitive biases, or inherent fallibility. Or perhaps there is truth out there to be had, and we are 
capable of getting at it, but we can never tell whether we have, and so should be reticent about 
pushing those truths. This would return to the epistemologically sceptical interpretation of 
Waldron considered above in relation to his irrelevance case.  
 
Enoch very briefly considers such possibilities, pointing to some comments of Waldron that 
might support this interpretation. For example, in a footnote in Law and Disagreement Waldron 
seems to pinpoint his scepticism specifically on the issue of how to grasp objective values, 
rather than their very existence: 
 
                                                          
112 Waldron, supra note 22 at 78. (emphasis added). 
113 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 176 (emphasis added).  
114 Ibid at 225 (‘rights themselves are morally complicated’) and 226 (‘In the area of rights...it is 
precisely questions of...moral priority that are at stake’). 
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'As long as objective values fail to disclose themselves to us, in our consciences or from 
the skies, in ways that leave no room for further disagreements about their character, all we 
have on earth are opinions or beliefs about objective value'.115 
 
This point seems to target just the accessibility, reliability, or defensibility of our moral 
judgements, not the idea that they can be independently "true" at all. So perhaps there is room 
for Waldron to hold on to the idea of objective moral truths in the abstract. This would dissolve 
the inconsistencies set out above by clarifying precisely which part of the "realist" case 
Waldron is and is not attacking. I would be sceptical of this for a number of reasons, however. 
As set out in section 2, above, I see this problem in knowing precisely when we are getting 
closer to moral truth, or distinguishing between less accurate and more accurate descriptions 
of a supposed (moral) reality as itself a reason for setting the idea of such reality aside; it sets 
us out onto a fruitless path, and one which does not, in light of the ubiquity of language, and 
the linguistic nature of "reality", make sense. If this is Waldron's stance, then my point would 
be, based on the sceptical anti-realism set out above, that he does not go far enough; he ends 
up holding on to a pointless and practically redundant metaphysical concept. However, I 
understand that this is a controversial argument and that not everyone will be convinced. Nor 
might they be particularly keen to let go of their metaphysical faith. It is possible that Waldron 
would share this reluctance. Indeed as set out above, in some moods at least he seems rather 
attached to it. This first point amounts to a mere philosophical disagreement, but the problems 
for Waldron on this interpretation go deeper. 
First, it is difficult to see how even this more nuanced "anti-realist" case could be squared with 
those stronger comments of Waldron that he, as an anti-realist, "puts the idea of moral truth 
aside" (see p17, above). Pointing out that the only problem with the realist case is that we 
cannot know whether we are reaching the moral truth with our evaluations, or cannot 
convincingly show to others that we are, while maintaining that such truth might still exist, 
does not put the idea of moral truth to one side; it presumes it.  
Perhaps again Waldron only ever intended to put the idea of moral truth aside when it comes 
to explaining moral judgement as a practical matter - he finds no practical room for the concept 
when it comes to explaining what is actually going on when people are making moral 
evaluations, because he denies it is something they can ever access. Waldron does specifically 
identify himself as an emotivist,116 so maybe his point was that all the evaluator is ever, in 
reality, getting at is their own feelings on the matters at hand, rather than truth itself.117 This 
would take us back to the epistemologically sceptical interpretation of Waldron; objective 
moral truths exist, but we find nothing but our emotions and sentiments.  
                                                          
115 Ibid at 111, n62. See Enoch, supra note 5 at 30, n20. 
116 Waldron, supra note 22 at 75. 
117 Ibid at 78 ('Some philosophers (me, for example) find first that emotivist or prescriptivist patterns of 
analysis provide what appear to be the best accounts available of what is going on when moral 
judgments are made and thought about and followed'). 
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However, if this is what Waldron meant by his self-declared "anti-realism", then it requires 
him to take a definition of realism which includes at its core a claim to epistemic accessibility 
and defensibility, either wholly or in part (because only then will the epistemological attack in 
the quote above amount to anti-realism).  But if that is the case  -  if anti-realism (in his view) 
may deny only the reliable accessibility or defensibility of moral facts in circumstances of 
disagreement - then there really is no hope for Waldron's irrelevance thesis. Because then on 
each of the interpretations offered above, it would turn out to rely wholly on anti-realist 
grounds, as defined by Waldron himself. This would not only see Waldron commit the fatal 
error of taking sides in a debate to dismiss its relevance, but would confirm that Waldron's 
concerns surrounding the arbitrary nature of the moral decision-making required by judicial 
review do have something to do with anti-realism itself after all. 
 
Finally, however, even if that definitional inconsistency can be overcome, this more nuanced 
"anti-realist" case would still not solve the problem of substantive inconsistency in Waldron's 
philosophical stance. For the more recent Waldron not only promotes the existence of moral 
truths in the abstract; on some topics, he appears to take some confidence in his view that he 
has these (radically) objective truths on his side.  
 
For example, to support her comment that she and Waldron are in agreement on the existence 
of objective moral truth, and that Waldron is even 'keen to stress' the realist idea of moral rights 
and wrongs 'independently of what people believe', Kavanagh points to his statement from Law 
and Disagreement that '"rape is wrong even in societies where it is a common practice"'.118 
Here Kavanagh is taking Waldron not only as accepting the idea of objective moral rights and 
wrongs, but as regarding this particular statement as an example of such a moral truth. Waldron 
appears confident that he knows this moral truth, and that those who deny it (even whole 
societies in his example) are wrong to think otherwise. Of course, this could be reading too 
much into Waldron's comment here - he could merely be stating that it is his judgement that 
rape is wrong even in societies that think otherwise, and that any disagreement does not affect 
this universalised subjective judgement, rather than making any claim about the independent 
foundation of his view. Without such a rider though, especially in light of the above sympathy 
shown to the idea of objective moral truths, it is plausible to interpret this claim in the stronger, 
epistemologically confident, moral realist sense. 
 
The same can be said of Waldron's later interventions on torture. In this later work, so strong 
is his confidence in the 'moral status' of torture as an 'abomination'119 that we see Jeremy 
Waldron - otherwise so trenchant in his call to respect the inescapable fact of disagreement, 
and the legitimacy of democratic participation on issues of rights - declare it to be 'a matter of 
                                                          
118 Kavanagh, supra note 1 at 460, n30. The quote is from Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 
3 at 105. 
119 Waldron, supra note 21 at 4. 
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shame' that the US even opened a 'national debate' on the issue.120  Such is his rectitude that 
we see Waldron come dangerously close to forgoing his central political philosophical premise 
and suggest that some things simply should not be open to disagreement - at the very least there 
is a tension in his denigrating of the positing of views opposed to his own absolutist view of 
the moral status of torture. With that, his belief 'that the wrongness of torture was constant 
before and after the terrorist attacks',121 comes across as more than just a personal belief, and, 
rather, metaphysically and epistemologically self-assured. Of course, I do not mean to suggest 
that holding strong moral preferences necessarily makes one a realist - on my view sceptics are 
just as able as anyone to hold moral values. However, in light of the (radically) objectivist 
sympathies - even yearnings - shown in this work, along with this uncharacteristically negative 
view of disagreement, it is hard to resist the suspicion that Waldron's sometime realism is 
playing an active role in his moral and political interventions these days. That is, it seems as 
though, at least when it comes to some of his own fundamental moral beliefs, Waldron goes 
beyond merely accepting the purely metaphysical possibility of objective moral truths, and puts 
his epistemology where his metaethical mouth is, throwing the weight of that radical realism 
for which he long yearned in the torture debate rather conveniently behind his own moral 
preferences.122 In these situations, the epistemic scepticism - such as it may be - seems to have 
been put aside.  
 
It seems, then, that Waldron's philosophical quandaries go deep. He is at best vague on the 
realist/anti-realist issue, at worst, incoherent. These problems go to the heart of his irrelevance 
case and his concerns about the arbitrariness of judicial moralising. As will be clear from the 
lengthy and winding discussion above, the task of getting all of his positions to hang together 
coherently at the same time is a formidable one – perhaps impossible. As we have seen, 
plausible interpretations which would avoid the problems noted in one area of his thought raise 
or re-raise the issues in another. In each case it is his problematic engagement with the 
philosophical issue that gets in the way. Whether these problems are insurmountable, or can be 
overcome with some much needed clarification, it seems that Waldron is far too casual in his 
approach to core philosophy. Indeed the various comments made on the realist/anti-realist 
discussed above are often very brief, almost "by the way" points. Depending on whether one 
sees the above problems are surmountable or not, Waldron either gives insufficient thought to 
his own philosophical stance and its consequences, or pays insufficient attention to explaining 
it clearly. Either way, the dangers of failing to fully recognise the importance of philosophy to 
constitutional theory are evident.  
 
5. Anti-Instrumentalism and the Curse of Realism 
                                                          
120 Ibid at 261. This is despite his occasional protests that he does 'not purport to say what a Christian 
must think on this matter', or has 'no right to insist' on what the Christian position should actually be 
(269).  
121 Ibid at 4. 
122 See also Ibid at 10 (contrasting his view on the constant moral wrongness of torture with those who 
disagree with his absolutist stance: 'I don't really think philosophers like Elshtain believe that there was 
a change in moral reality after September 11...'). 
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As the final part of Waldron's cautionary tale presented here, this section will take a closer look 
at the core constitutionalist issue of decision-making authority that concerns him. The 
instrumentalist approach to decision-making authority - popular in constitutionalist debate - 
will be examined. This is a case in point because, as will be seen, it is very much a realist-
fuelled approach to constitutionalist theory, and one against which Waldron lays some heavy 
criticisms. But he attempts to do so while leaving their - and perhaps even his own - realist 
presuppositions untouched. This, it is suggested, leads his argument into difficulties. The 
argument will be that the responses to Waldron's anti-instrumentalist case - while arguable if 
one accepts, or remains equivocal, on their realist assumptions - lose all force if these 
assumptions are rejected. For Waldron's tale, the significance of this is that it shows, in concrete 
terms, the difference the realist/anti-realist issue can make to the force of his own arguments. 
It also sets the scene for the sequel to Waldron’s tale; a philosophically grounded, openly anti-
realist constitutionalist approach - one in which instrumentalism, as popularly conceived, has 
no place.  
 
 
5.1. The Instrumentalist Approach and its Justification  
The instrumentalist approach holds that 'the justification of political authority must ultimately 
rest on its instrumental value to "good government"'.123 In the context of rights and 
constitutional theory,  Kavanagh adopts this approach to hold the constitutional design 'that is 
most likely to yield morally right decisions, or is likely to yield the most morally right 
decisions, is most justified'.124 Thus, the (lack of) justification of constitutional review, for 
Kavanagh, 'hinges crucially on its conduciveness to producing good outcomes for human 
rights'.125 This kind of approach is widespread in constitutional and political theory. For 
example, for  Rawls, the 'fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its 
likely results'.126 Similarly, Dworkin argues that the 'best institutional structure is the one best 
calculated to produce the best answers'.127 Raz goes as far as to call it 'the natural way to 
proceed'  on the issue of rights in society 'to assume that enforcement of fundamental rights 
should be entrusted to whichever political procedure is...most likely to enforce them well'.128 
                                                          
123 A Kavanagh, “Constitutional Review, the Courts, and Democratic Scepticism” (2009) 62:1 Current 
Legal Problems 102 at 113.  Kavanagh's use of the "instrumental condition of good government" draws 
on J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 117. 
124 Kavanagh, supra note 1 at 460. See also Kavanagh, supra note 123 at 113. 
125 Kavanagh, supra note 123 at 125. 
126 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 202. 
127 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) at 34. 
128 Raz, supra note 5 at 45. 
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Some go even further and hold that '[g]overnmental institutions...are justified solely by the 
consequences they produce, including the consequences for rights violations'.129 
The justification for adopting this instrumentalist condition of authority - of delivering 
decisions 'in accordance with right reason'130 - is twofold. It stems from the moral nature of 
political decision-making, along with the importance of these decisions for society. Kavanagh 
explains both of these reasons straightforwardly as follows. Political decisions, she notes, often 
have 'a moral content'131 - that is, they 'involve a choice between states of affairs or actions 
which are morally right or wrong, better or worse, independently of what people prefer’.132 
Because of this, 'it seems clear that a good governmental decision-procedure must be 
acceptable from a moral point of view', and, to be so acceptable, a decision-making procedure 
or institution must be 'likely, by and large, to produce morally right decisions'.133 In  addition,  
because the moral nature of these decisions means that they will 'inevitably affect the moral 
quality of our lives and institutions', an institution can only have the authority to make them 'if 
they can generally make them well'.134 And by making a decision "well", Kavanagh once again 
means reaching a 'morally correct' outcome.135 On these grounds, a decision-making procedure 
or arrangement is 'acceptable only insofar as it is designed to reach morally correct decisions'; 
if it is not likely to reach such decisions, it 'cannot be justified and should not be adopted'.136 
All this talk of "morally correct" decisions instantly raises the spectre of moral realism - 
confirmed explicitly by Kavanagh when she writes that in putting forward her approach she 
'assume[s] that there is such a thing as a morally right and wrong decision', independent of 
belief.137 The significance of this will be returned to below, but first we will take a look at 
Waldron's response to such instrumentalist approaches.  
 
5.2. Waldron's Anti-Instrumentalism 
In Law and Disagreement Waldron titles his discussion of instrumentalist approaches to 
authority 'The Trouble With Rights-Instrumentalism'.138 The title leaves no room for doubt 
where that discussion ends up, but Waldron in fact begins by praising the idea behind such 
approaches. It is 'honourable', he says, because it takes 'very seriously' the possibility of 
                                                          
129 L Alexander, “Is Judicial Review Democratic? A Comment on Harel” (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 
277 at 283. 
130 Kavanagh, supra note 1 at 460. 
131 Ibid at 461. 
132 Ibid at 460. 
133 Ibid at 462. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid at 460, n30. 
138 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 252ff. 
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reaching the 'wrong answer'.139  On 'matters of principle' such as this, we are told, this would 
have the disastrous consequence that rights are 'violated'.140 Likewise, in a later article Waldron 
writes  that '[b]ecause rights are important, it is likewise important that we get them right', 
meaning that we must 'take outcome-related' arguments in the constitutionalist debate 'very 
seriously indeed'.141 It will be noted that this sentiment accords with the justification for 
instrumentalism noted above - that the nature of the issues involved in rights decisions are such 
that they have the potential to greatly affect our lives and that the moral quality of these 
decisions is therefore of great importance. However, while initially praising the instrumentalist 
approach in theory, and apparently supporting much of the ground on which it is justified, 
Waldron objects to its use in practice. 
 
5.2.1. Instrumentalism as Question-Begging 
Waldrons overarching attack on the instrumentalist approach is that it is 'question-begging' in 
the context of disagreement.142 It is question-begging to 'use rights instrumentalism as a basis 
for the design of political procedures among people who disagree',143 because putting it into 
practice 'presupposes our possession of the truth in designing an authoritative procedure whose 
point it is to settle that very issue'.144 It either presupposes our possession of the truth about 
rights and what they involve, or the truth about how to access that moral truth. These slightly 
different presuppositions are entailed by different ways of operationalising the instrumentalist 
goal.  
The first is what one might call "direct instrumentalism", which presents the instrumentalist 
task as 'an empirical one, to be settled by the way the world is.'145 The idea is that the records 
of various institutions are to be compared and an inference drawn as to which is more likely to 
reach the "correct" result from an inspection of which has done so more often.146 This is partly 
what Kavanagh has in mind when she states that the 'judicial record of upholding rights matters 
a great deal' when assessing the justification for constitutional review.147  
Waldron is right that this kind of approach, observing the record of various institutions and 
arrangements, clearly requires a standard of what the "morally correct" result is, or what it 
means to "uphold rights". Without it, it can be asked how one could say whether the correct or 
best outcome has been reached in any given decision, and therefore whether it counts for 
                                                          
139 Ibid at 252. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Waldron, "Core of the Case", supra note 3 at 1373. 
142 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 253. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Alexander, supra note 129 at 279. 
146 T Campbell, “Human Rights: A Culture of Controversy” (1999) 26:1 Journal of Law and Society 6 
at 13–14. 
147 Kavanagh, supra note 123 at 118. 
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against that decision-making arrangement. Without a substantive standard of "moral truth" to 
use as a benchmark in assessing the past record of competing arrangements and institutions 
this empirical approach is practically unworkable. But it is precisely this issue - what the "moral 
truth" or "correct outcome" is - that people disagree over.  
However, Waldron's critique of instrumentalism as question-begging also catches those who 
take a less direct - 'more modest' - instrumentalist approach.148 Instead of relying on a particular 
view as to what the right outcome is and assessing the past record of institutions on this basis, 
this approach focuses on more 'general institutional considerations about the way in which' 
they make their decisions, including the 'factors which influence' them.149 A particularly 
popular example of this kind of argument focuses on the influence of public opinion on the 
decision-maker. The 'popular accountability' of elected politicians, we are frequently told, 
'generates a risk that a popular decision will be chosen, even if it is not the right decision'.150 It 
is easier for judges, because of their unelected nature, to 'withstand popular pressure...and to 
make the right decision'.151 Raz makes this point when he writes that there are 'ample reasons 
to suspect that members of the legislature are moved by sectarian interests to such a degree that 
they are not likely even to attempt to establish what rights (some) people have'. 152 This, again, 
makes it less likely that 'the correct content of rights' will be 'revealed' or 'discover[ed]'.153 
By focusing on general institutional considerations, rather than the past decision-making record 
of institutions, this may allow conclusions to be drawn about which institution is 'most likely 
to get at the truth about rights, whatever that truth turns out to be'.154 But it itself comes with 
the presupposition that one knows which factors make truth more or less likely to be 
"discovered". And just as there is disagreement over rights themselves and what the correct 
outcome is in a right dispute, we are 'not in possession of any uncontroversial moral 
epistemology'.155 In fact, disagreement is so widespread that even 'professional epistemologists' 
do not have 'the sort of consensus about paths to moral truth that would be required for a non-
question-begging instrumental defence' of procedures to be used 'among those who disagree'.156 
So again, as it was in relation to direct empirical instrumentalist approaches, Waldron's point 
is that what factors make reaching "moral truth" more or less likely is a controversial matter - 
                                                          
148 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 253. 
149 Kavanagh, supra note 1 at 466. 
150 Kavanagh, supra note 7 at 345. 
151 Ibid at 347. 
152 Raz, supra note 5 at 46. 
153 Ibid. As another example see MJ Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) at 102 ('As a matter of comparative institutional competence, the 
politically insulated...judiciary is more likely, when the human rights issue is a deeply controversial 
one, to move us in the direction of a right answer (assuming there is such a thing) than is the political 
process left to its own devices, which tends to resolve such issues by reflexive, mechanical reference to 
established moral conventions’). 
154 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 253. 
155 Ibid at 254. 
156 Ibid. 
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subject to widespread disagreement - but one must rely on a particular view in designing and 
justifying decision-making procedures on an instrumentalist basis; that is, one which pursues 
the "right" or "just" outcome . 
 
5.2.2. The Instrumentalist Response and the Curse of Realism 
All of the above seems well-placed; there is widespread disagreement in society over rights - 
we see it every day. Indeed this is only to be expected due to the controversial, morally-charged 
nature of the issues involved in questions of rights and principle. So it is likely to be the case 
that a particular outcome will be seen as "correct" or "just" by some, but "incorrect" or "unjust" 
by others.157 There is also disagreement over which purported path to moral truth to take - as 
the plethora of realist epistemologies shows. Thus, taking a stance on either or both of these 
issues (what the truth is, or how to get there) - as instrumentalists must to put their approach 
into practice - will beg the question from the perspective of those who take a different stance: 
someone who believes same-sex marriage is morally unproblematic against someone who 
believes it is unacceptable (and vice versa); someone who believes in utilitarian ethics against 
a natural lawyer, or an evangelical Christian, and so on. It would be difficult for anyone to 
object to this part of Waldron's argument.  
However, the same cannot be said of his further premise that this fact makes instrumentalism 
unacceptably question-begging. It is here that the realist/anti-realist issue becomes relevant 
once again. To a realist, this argument can be seen as putting a concern to avoid begging the 
question above the dangers of getting rights-issues "wrong", with all of the consequences this 
may have for the lives of those involved.  
For example, Fabre, noting the existence of disagreement, simply replies that 'if one allows for 
the possibility that someone may be wrong' on these issues, then 'why not argue that in so far 
as he [or she] is wrong' their views 'should not prevail?'158 It can be recognised that 
disagreements need to be settled to some extent, but for Fabre it is of vital importance that the 
co-ordinated action is 'one which can be said to constitute a just position'.159 This should come 
as no surprise given that, as seen earlier, the goal of instrumentalism is to reach the morally 
correct outcomes, not merely an outcome for the sake of it. Given this goal, and the importance 
of the issues at stake in those political decisions with a "moral content", 'one has to bite the 
bullet, and stand, in the face of others' disagreeing with us, for what is just'.160 Some, maybe 
many, will disagree on controversial matters - they are controversial after all - but to those 
who accept the existence of "moral truths", '[t]hose judgments may be wrong, in which case 
respecting them may entail allowing those whose judgments they are to impose immoral 
constraints and duties on other people'.161 Raz makes this same response in dismissing 
                                                          
157 Waldron, supra note 110 at 36. 
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Waldron's point about the controversial nature of epistemology as (somewhat ironically) 'true, 
but irrelevant'.162 It is irrelevant because the fact that 'sound moral epistemology is 
controversial does not mean that we cannot know what it requires';  rather, it merely follows 
'that avoiding moral controversy is not a goal to be pursued'.163 Effectively, the basic reply here 
is that "truth" and "justice" should not be allowed to be held to ransom by those who disagree 
- there is simply too much at stake.  
This criticism goes to the very heart of Waldron's constitutional intervention; all the way down 
to his fundamental premise that each individual is a 'potential moral agent, endowed with 
dignity and autonomy',164 and that respecting this in circumstances of disagreement requires 
individuals to be given the opportunity to participate equally in collective decision-making.165 
As per his famous "rights-based" argument in favour of political equality, and against the strong 
judicial review of legislation, Waldron claims that this view of the individual as a dignified and 
autonomous moral agent is the one assumed by the very attribution of rights.166  
The reply is again that this respect due to the individual, such as it may be, does not outweigh 
the importance of getting matters "right". As Raz puts it, '[r]especting people as rational self-
directing agents does not require desisting from following true beliefs which those people 
dispute'.167 Likewise, Arneson's reply is that respect for rational agency requires treating 
individuals according to 'the principles best supported by moral reasons'; after all, these are the 
principles that individuals would choose if they were 'fully rational'.168 Even more strongly, 
Enoch reminds us that the respect that individuals merit, and on which the attribution of rights 
may be based, is 'perfectly consistent with our being stupid, morally corrupt, almost bound to 
act wrongly'.169 It is thus no "disrespect" to take this possibility seriously, and, if 'the evidence 
points to the conclusion' that this is generally the case, then it is doubtful whether either 
'morality in general or the duty to treat people with respect' require us to behave as though it 
were otherwise.170 
Of course, this response can only work - if indeed it works - if one accepts the idea of "moral 
truth" in the first place; only then does it make sense to say that disagreement cannot be allowed 
to get in the way of getting fundamental issues of rights and morality "right". But this is not 
                                                          
162 Raz, supra note 5 at 47. 
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something which Waldron can challenge in defence of his constitutionalist case, because this 
would directly contradict his irrelevance argument. Indeed, as above, the realist worldview is 
something which Waldron seems to actively accept at times. Even then it can be replied that 
this is a matter of balance; even for those who accept that there is "truth" to be had here, a 
relevant question might be what weight should respecting disagreement be given as compared 
to the value in reaching the truth of the matter? This is itself an evaluative, moral issue, open 
to disagreement and so the above may not, taken alone, necessarily be a knockdown argument 
against Waldron. That is not my suggestion here. But he is left open to it. And he is left open 
to it on the basis of his sometime realist leanings.  
Furthermore, add to this another concession of Waldron's and seems to be in a rather difficult 
bind. The prioritising of "morally correct" outcomes could be seen as the logical result of the 
great importance Waldron himself attaches to the quality of decisions on rights. That is, the 
importance Waldron himself attaches to getting these matters "right". As already noted, this 
led him to praise as 'honourable' the approach which takes the possibility of reaching the 'wrong 
answers' and the harm that will result 'very seriously'.171 What the above reply amounts to is 
the claim that, if one is to take the dangers of getting decisions wrong "very seriously" - as 
Waldron directs us to - then one should treat avoiding this outcome as of fundamental 
importance when choosing and justifying a decision-making institution that is to settle the issue 
of what outcomes are to be enforced in society. On this logic, it is very plausible to suggest that 
begging the question from the perspective of those who disagree about what rights do or should 
involve (but could be wrong - as a matter of independent truth - to so disagree), should not be 
an issue if one is taking the moral quality of the decisions to be enforced in society sufficiently 
seriously. The issues at stake are too important to risk getting things wrong. It is only plausible, 
perhaps, but again Waldron would find it difficult to downplay the importance of getting 
matters "right" because he himself stresses it.172 Thus, Waldron himself can be seen as 
providing the tools for the dismantling of his own position. The spectre of realism continues to 
haunt Waldron, all the way down to the foundation of his prized constitutionalist theory.  
That is where Waldron's tale ends. His approach to the philosophical realist/anti-realist issue - 
which on the narrative present here has led to some misguided (if Waldron is a realist), ill 
thought out, or at least underdeveloped comments and concessions (if he is not) - has left his 
constitutionalist approach open to some penetrating criticisms. Given these concessions and 
arguments it is difficult to see a safe way forward for Waldron. It is difficult for him to hold on 
to his supposedly philosophically neutral constitutionalist case, his "anti-realism" (whatever he 
may mean by that), sometime realism (and sometime radical realism), his prime concern for 
                                                          
171 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 3 at 252. 
172 In fact, the importance Waldron attaches to rights, and to getting matters "right" here does lead him 
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respecting disagreement, and also stressing of the importance of getting matters "right" and 
avoiding the problematic dangers of getting things "wrong", all at the same time.  
 
5.3. Breaking the Realist Spell: A Sceptical Rejection of Instrumentalist Approaches 
We are now in a position to set the scene for a new tale, however; that of a sceptical journey 
into constitutional theory, on a path openly grounded in anti-realist philosophy. It begins with 
some ground clearing where Waldron left off.  While, as above Waldron appears to accept the 
idea of, and justification for, the instrumentalist approach in theory - the existence of "moral 
truth", and the importance of achieving it - the consequence of the sceptical anti-realist 
argument here is that the very idea of instrumentalism is misguided. With this, its theoretical 
justification falls away.  
Once the idea of a "right" or "wrong" independent of the preferred descriptions of individuals 
is set aside, the instrumentalist approach is rendered meaningless. Contrary to its key 
justification, political decisions cannot be said to 'involve a choice between states of affairs or 
actions that are morally right or wrong, better or worse, independently of what people 
prefer'.173 No sense can be made of the idea that 'one has to bite the bullet' and stand 'for what 
is just'174 even in the face of disagreement, because no sense can be made of the idea that 
anything "is" just. Likewise, the idea that, disagreement notwithstanding, we can "know" how 
to 'reveal[]' or 'discover' the so-called 'correct content of rights'175 goes because there is, on the 
anti-realist view, nothing to "discover". Contrary to Waldron's concessions, then, the 
instrumentalist approach, as popularly conceived, is not "honourable" or otherwise worthy of 
praise. Far from it. On a consistent anti-realist view, the instrumentalist condition becomes 
philosophically meaningless - a baffling non-starter. This is what it means to set aside the realist 
concepts of moral truth and objectivity - and to set them aside wholesale - as the anti-realist 
Waldron once claimed to.  
It will no doubt be noticed that this is a negative argument: having dismissed the instrumentalist 
approach as philosophically misguided, the question becomes, what would a sceptical approach 
to decision-making authority within a constitution look like? That is an important question, and 
answering it is no easy task. That is for another day however; doing so would lead us into a 
tale too long to tell here. 
 
6. Conclusion: Lessons to be Learned 
If the philosopher's stone is the key to fortune, immortality, and ultimately perfection, then in 
the tale told here, it is Waldron himself who stands in the way of his achievement of that prize. 
His travails stem from his engagement with core philosophy within his thought. His irrelevance 
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case is, on each interpretation considered, unconvincing. Yet it may be behind the lack of any 
rigorous engagement with the philosophical issue throughout Waldron's work, something 
which leaves his substantive philosophical stance as, at best, in need of clarification, and at 
worst hopelessly riddled with inconsistencies. In light of the holistic exploration of Waldron's 
engagement with philosophy attempted in this piece, it can only be concluded that getting his 
various positions, comments and arguments across his thought to hang together coherently and 
convincingly is an unenviable task, at times resembling a frustrating game of "whack-a-mole"; 
interpret away one inconsistency or tension and another rears its head. Whether this task can 
be achieved, as things stand, Waldron's seemingly casual approach to the philosophical debate 
is problematic, if only because it makes it so difficult to pin down a coherent position. His 
philosophical comments also lead Waldron into some difficult waters regarding his anti-
instrumentalist case; combined with other concessions flowing rather easily from his sometime 
entertaining of the concept of moral truth, Waldron gives his legal constitutionalist foes the 
tools they need to dismantle his prized constitutionalist theory.  
Like all good tales, there are lessons to be learned from this, both for Waldron and more 
generally. For Waldron, the arguments above suggest a need to reassess or at the very least 
clarify his stance on and use of core philosophy - the stakes are too high not to. And with his 
irrelevance case out of the way, his own stance in the philosophical debate may take on an extra 
significance. 
There is a more general lesson here too: the story told above regarding Waldron's 
constitutionalist path shows the dangers one may face; take a wrong turn and the consequences 
can be dire. The attempt to brush aside fundamental questions of moral philosophy can lead 
one to the dead end of incoherence, and, ultimately, place the constitutional theory in danger. 
It seems then that the path to the philosopher's stone must be the one paved with rigorous and 
considered philosophy.  
Leaving Waldron's tale, the latter parts of this article have prepared some of the ground on 
which a sceptical path into the realm of constitutional theory can be built, having pulled the 
instrumentalist approach to constitutional theory out by its realist roots. However, the rest of 
this, undoubtedly long journey, must be left for a sequel.  
 
